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FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 
Keith B. Halt 
This Article discusses Fifth Circuit opinions published in 1999 
regarding six topics- removal, abstention, appellate jurisdiction, 
defa ult judgment procedure, stan ding, and the first- to-file rule. 
I. REMOVAL 
A. Post-Removal Joinder of Nondiverse Defendants 
I n  Cobb v. Delta Exports, Inc., 1 the Fift h Circu it addressed 
whether a district court permitting the post- removal joinder of 
nondiverse defendants may den y  a motion to remand to state 
court on the basis that the nondiverse defendants were fr audu­
lently joined. 2 
I n  Cobb, the City of L ake Charles engaged a con tractor to re­
move tree limbs and other debris after an ice storm.3 The contra­
ctor hired a subcontractor, which in turn hired a secon d  subcon­
tractor. 4 Wh ile removing debris, an employee of the second 
subcontractor backed a piece of heavy equipment into a vehicle on 
a city street, injuring M r. Cobb, a L ouisiana citizen. 5 
M r. Cobb and his wife sued the second subcontractor and its 
insurer, both foreign domiciliaries, in state court.6 The defendants 
• Mr. Hall practices law at Stone, Pigman, Walther, Wittmann & Hutchinson, L.L.P., 
where his work focuses on commercial litigation and toxic torts. He previously served as 
Managing Editor of the Loyola Law Review, and he worked as a chemical engineer prior to 
attending law school. 
1. 1 86 F.3d 675 (5th Cir. 1 999). 
2. See id. at 676-77. 
3. See id. at 676. 
4. See id. 
5. See id. 
6. See Cobb, 1 86 F.3d at 676. 
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removed' to federal court on the basis of diversity8 jurisdiction.9 
After removal, the Cobbs filed an unopposed motion to amend 
their complaint10 to add claims against the first subcontractor, the 
employee who drove the equipment, the City, and the contractor, 
the latter two of which are Louisiana domiciliaries. 11 The federal 
district court granted the motion to amend, and the Cobbs subse­
quently moved to remand.12 The court denied the remand motion, 
concluding that the two Louisiana-domiciled defendants had been 
"fraudulently joined."13 Pursuant to the "fraudulent joinder" 
doctrine, the existence of diversity jurisdiction is not destroyed by 
a plaintiffs fraudulent pleading of jurisdictional facts or by his 
assertion of claims against nondiverse defendants against whom 
the plaintiff has no possibility of establishing a cause of action. 14 
The Cobbs appealed the denial of their remand motion. 15 The 
Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that a remand was required by 
28 U.S.C. § 144 7(e), which states that "if after removal the plain­
tiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would 
destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or 
permitjoinder and remand the action to the State Court."16 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plain language of the 
statute gives the district court only two options-(1) deny joinder 
or (2) permitjoinder and remand. 17 Thus, a court may not permit 
joinder of nondiverse defendants and then fail to remand. 18 
The fraudulent joinder doctrine was inapplicable because 
"[t]he fraudulent joinder doctrine does not apply to joinders that 
occur after an action is removed. "19 The court reasoned that a 
7. See Cobb, 186 F.3d at 676; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994). 
8. SeeCobb, 186F.3dat 616;seealso28U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). 
9. See Cobb, 186 F.3d at 676. 
10. See id.; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 15(a). 
11. See Cobb, 186 F.3d at 676. 
12. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 
13. See Cobb, 186 F.3d at 676. 
14. See id. at 677. 
15. See id. at 676. 
16. Id. at 677 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (e)). 
17. See id. 
18. See Cobb, 186 F.3d at 677. 
19. Id. (emphasis added). 
2000 )  Federal Procedure 10 3 
district court "woul d n ever" gran t a request to join n ondiverse 
defendan ts again st whom recover y is impossibl e.20 T he court 
n oted that because § 144 7(e) gives a court discretion to prohibit 
join der, a defen dan t  has a chan ce at the time joind er is requested 
to argue that the pl ain tiff has no col orabl e cl aim against the party 
that he seeks to join and that join der therefore shoul d  n ot be 
permitted. 21 
The Fifth Circuit al so concl uded that its in terpretation of § 
144 7(e) was supported by l egisl ative history- in par ticul ar by 
Con gr ess's rejection in 1988 of a proposed version of§ 144 7(e) that 
expressl y woul d have given distr ict cour ts the discr etion to retain 
jurisdiction after permittin g joinder of n on diverse defendants. 22 
Further, the court's hol din g was required by Fift h Circuit prece­
den t existin g prior to the adoption of the current version of § 
144 7(e).23 The precedent hel d that "post-removal joind er of a 
n on-d iverse, dispensabl e  party destroys diversity jurisdiction. "24 
Fin all y, the court expl ain ed that Cobb was n ot controll ed by 
the S upreme Court's decision in Freeport-McMoran, Inc. v. KN 
Energy, Inc. 25 In Freeport-McMoran, two pl ain tiffs brought a 
diversity action . 26 After on e of the pl aintiffs transfe rred its in ter­
ests to a nondiverse en tity, the pl ain tiffs sought and obtained 
leave to amen d  their cl aim to substitute the nondiverse party 
pursuan t to Federal Rul e of Civil P rocedure 25 (c). 27 After a 
verdict for the pl ain tiffs, the court of appeal s  r eversed, hol ding 
that the district court l acked subject matter jurisdiction aft er the 
substitution of the n on diverse par ty because the substitution 
destroyed diversity.28 The S upreme Court reversed the appell ate 
court an d produced an opin ion statin g that "if jurisdiction ex­
ist[ed) at the time an action [ was] commen ced, such jurisd iction 
20. See Cobb, 1 86 F.3d at 678. 
21. See id. 
22. See id. at 677. 
23. See id. 
24. Id. at 677 (citing Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1 1 79, 1 1 8 1  (5th Cir. 1987)). 
25. 498 U.S. 426 ( 1 99 1 )  (per curiarn), cited in Cobb, 1 86 F.3d at 678. 
26. See Freeport-McMoran, 498 U.S. at 427. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. 
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may not be di vested by subsequent events."29 In Cobb, however, 
the Fi fth Ci rcui t  d etermi ned that the broad language of Freeport­
McMoran was di cta and that the case's holdi ng was li mi ted to 
Fed eral Rule of Ci vi l P roced ure 25 substi tuti ons.30 In maki ng that 
d etermi nati on, the Fi fth Ci rcui t reli ed on the language of § 
144 7(e) and opi ni ons fr om two other appellate courts.3 1 
In short, d efend ants may oppose post- removal joi nd er of 
nondi verse d efe nd ants agai nst whom plai nti ffs have no colorable 
clai m. If, however, nondi verse d efe nd ants are joi ned , the di stric t 
court loses subject matter juri sdi cti on and has no power to con­
sid er whether joi nd er was fr aud ulent.3 2 The Fi fth Ci rcui t ex­
pressly left open, though, the questi on of whether a di stri ct court 
may exerci se i ts i nherent power to recall i ts jud gment and wi th­
d raw the ord er permi tti ng joi nd er.33 
B. Review of Remand Orders 
1. Remands Not Based on § 1447(c) 
In Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc.,34 the Fi fth Ci rcui t  ex­
ami ned the ci rcumstances und er whi ch 28 U .S.C. § 144 7(d) 
prohi bi ts appellate revi ew of remand s  to state court and those 
und er whi ch fed eral preempti on of state law provid es fed eral 
questi on juri sdi cti on. 3 5  
In Giles, the plai nti ffs son di ed whi le und er the care of a 
medi cal group selected by her health mai ntenance organi zati on 
("HM0 ").3 6 The HM O offered i ts servi ces through an employee 
benefit plan provid ed by the plai nti ffs employer.37 The plai nti ff  
brought clai ms agai nst the HM O, the medi cal group, and two 
29. See Freeport-McMoran, 498 U.S. at 428. 
30. See Cobb, 186 F.3d at 680. 
31. See id. at 680-81 (citing Burka v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 
Casas Office Machines, Inc. v. Mita Copystar of Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
32. See Cobb, 186 F.3d at 678. 
33. See id. at 678 n.8. 
34. 172 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1999). 
35. See id. at 336. 
36. See id. at 335. 
37. See id. 
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p hysician s that had treated her son .38 The pl ain tiffs cl aims 
again st her HM O in cl uded n egl igen ce in sel ectin g the medical 
group, vicarious liability, breach of con tract, breach of warran ty, 
an d misrepresen tation .39 The HM O removed on the basis that the 
E mp loyee's Retiremen t In come S ecurity Act ("E RIS A") compl etel y 
p reempted the pl ain tiffs cl aims.' 0 The p lain tiff amen ded her 
compl ain t to dismiss cl aims for breach of con tract, breach of war­
ran ty, an d misrep resen tation , which she con ceded were pre­
em pted, an d moved for a reman d. 41 The district court reman ded, 
con cludin g  that E RIS A di d n ot compl etel y  p reempt the plain tiffs 
remain in g  cl aim s an d that the court shoul d util ize its discretion to 
refr ain fr om exercisin g suppl emen tal jurisdiction .42 
The Fifth Circuit first examin ed whether it had jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal .43 P ursuan t  to 28 U .S .C. § 144 7(d), an order 
reman din g a case removed to fe deral court gen erall y may n ot be 
reviewed.44 However, the S upreme Court has hel d  that the 
p rohibition on review of reman ds appl ies onl y  to § 144 7(c) re­
m an ds- that is, rem an ds based on either a defe ct in removal 
p rocedure or a lack of subject matter jurisdiction . 45 Accordin gl y, a 
litigan t may ap peal a reman d based on discretion ary groun ds. 
These groun ds in clude reman ds based on absten tion an d reman ds 
based on a court's discretion un der certain groun ds en umerated in 
28 U .S. C. § 136 7(c) n ot to exercise su ppl emen tal jurisdi ction .4 6 
H owever, reman d  orders are reviewable on ly if the district court 
"cl early an d affirm ativel y'' rel ies on a groun d for reman d  other 
than § 144 7(c).47 In this case, the district court had expressl y 
stated that it was rem an din g based on its discretion ary decision 
38. See Giles, 172 F.3d at 335 . 
39. See id. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. 
43. See Giles, 172 FJd at 335. 
44. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1994)). 
45. See id. at 335-36 & n.I. See e.g., Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 5 1 6  U.S. 124, 
127-28 (1 995); Angelides v. Baylor College of Med., 117 F.3d 833, 835-36 (5th Cir. 1997). 
46. See Giles, 172 F.3d at 335-36. 
4 7. See id. at 336. 
. 
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not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.48 Thus, § 14 47(d) did 
not b ar review of the remand order. 
Having determined that it could review the remand order, the 
court next examined whether a b asis of sub ject matter jurisdiction 
exi sted.49 The HM O argued that ER IS A  completely preempts 
plaintiffs claims and that this preemption created a federal 
question.50 Preemption is b ased on the supremacy clause of the 
United S tates Constitution.51 W hen federal and state laws con­
fl ict, the state laws are preempted and have no eff ect. 52 Thus, 
preemption b y  federal law sometimes is a defense to state law 
claims. 53 But under the well- pleaded complaint rule, the exis­
tence of a federal law defense to a state law claim does not prov ide 
federal question jurisdiction.54 R ather, federal question jurisdic­
tion exists only if the plaintiffs well- pleaded complaint is itself 
b ased in part on federal law. 55 A ccordingly, ordinary or "confl ict 
preemption" does not provide a b asis for federal question jurisdic­
tion.116 
On the other hand, the doctrine of "complete preemption" pro­
vides that federal legislation sometimes will so completely occupy 
a particular fi eld that it leaves no room for operation of any state 
laws on the sub ject. 57 In such circumstances, any civil complaint 
raising claims in that field is necessarily federal in character, 
even if the claims purportedly are b ased on state law. 58 Thus, the 
48. See Giles, 1 72 F.3d at 337-39. 
49. See id. 
50. See id. at 335, 338. 
51. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
52. See id.; see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 
9.1 , at 3 1 9 (5th ed. 1 995). 
53. See Giles, 1 72 F.3d at 337. 
54. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 2 1 1 U.S. 1 49, 1 52-54 ( 1 908); Giles, 1 72 
F.3d at 337. 
55. See Mottley, 2 1 1 U.S. at 1 52-54; Giles, 172 F.3d at 337-38. 
56. See Giles, 1 72 F.3d at 337. 
57. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66-67 ( 1 987); Giles, 172 
F.3d at 336. 
58. See Giles, 1 72 F.3d at 336. 
2000] Federal Procedure 10 7 
assertion of completely preempted state law claims raises a 
federal question and provides a basis for removal. 59 
The Fifth C ircuit reasoned that the plaintiff had originally 
raised both claims that possibly were completely preempted and 
claims that arguably were confl ict-preempted. 60 The completely 
preempted claims, together with supplemental jurisdiction, had 
provided a valid basis for removing the entire case.61 However, 
pursuant to the plain tiffs motion , all of the completely preempted 
claims had been dismissed. 62 The Fift h C ircuit held that when a 
district court dismisses the claims that provide the · basis for 
original jurisdiction , the district court has discretion whether to 
continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the pendant 
state law claims or to discontinue exercising supplemental juris­
diction and reman d the remaining claims to state court. 63 In 
Giles, the Fift h C ircuit held that the district court had not abused 
its discretion by remanding the state law claims to state court.64 
Accordingly, the Fift h C ircuit affi rmed.65 
2. Remands Based on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) 
Another E RIS A case, Smith v. Texas Children's Hospital, 66 il­
lustrates the principle that if a remand is based on § 144 7(c), then 
§ 144 7(d) generally bars appellate review.67 In Smith, the defen­
dant removed on grounds of complete preemption.68 After com­
pletely preempted claims were dismissed, the court remanded, 
apparen tly based on a discretionary decision n ot to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction.69 The reman d  was appealed, and the 
Fift h C ircuit sen t  the case back to the district court for reconsid-
59. See Giles, 172 F.3d at 337. 
60. See id. at 338. 
61. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1 994) (supplementaljurisdict ion). 
62. See Giles, 1 72 F.3d at 338-39. 
63. See id. at 338. 
64. See id. at 339. 
65. See id. at 339-40. 
66. 172 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1999). 
67. See id. at 924-25. 
68. See id. 
69. See id. at 925. 
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eration of an issue.70 This time the district court remanded on the 
basis of§ 1447(c), concluding that it lacked subject matter juris­
diction.71 The defendant appealed, arguing that the Fifth Circuit's 
prior handling of the case implicitly included a finding that 
subject matter jurisdiction existed and that such a finding was 
law of the case.72 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating 
that pursuant to § 1447(d) it lacked the authority to review the 
remand order even if the order was erroneous. 73 
II. BURFORD ABSTENTION 
In Webb v. B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc. ,74 the Fifth Circuit exam­
ined whether a district court may exercise Burford abstention75 if 
the plaintiff asserts no equitable claims and whether a claim in 
quantum meruit sounds in equity, thereby allowing remand. 76 
The plaintiff in Webb was a state-appointed receiver for an 
insolvent insurer.77 The receiver sued one of the insurer's policy­
holders to collect unpaid premiums, asserting three alternative 
causes of action, including one in quantum meruit.78 The policy­
holder removed to federal court on grounds of diversity.79 The 
receiver moved to remand, and the court granted the motion 
based on Burford abstention. 80 The policyholder appealed. 81 
70. See Smith, 172 F.3d at 925. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. at 926. 
73. See id.; see also Copling v. The Container Store, Inc., 174 F.3d 590, 596 (5th Cir. 
1999) (holding that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to 
review remand). 
74. 174 F.3d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 399 (1999). 
75. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18 (1943). 
76. See Webb, 174 F.3d at 701, 703. 
77. See id. at 699. 
78. See id. 
79. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (1994) (establishing diversity jurisdiction and 
removal, respectively). 
80. See Webb, 174 F.3d at 699. 
81. See id. 
2000) Federal Procedure 109 
The court concluded that it had jurisdiction,82 then examined 
whether the exercise of Burford abstention was proper.83 The 
various abstention doctrines permit federal courts in certain 
circumstances to abstain fr om hearing cases even though subject 
matter jurisdiction exists.84 The Burford doctrine, for example, 
permits a federal court to abstain fr om hearing a case in deference 
to complex state administrative procedures. 85 Indeed, Burford 
abstention must be exercised by a federal court sitting in equity if 
timely and adequate state- court review i s  available, and either (1) 
the case involves diffi cult questions of state law bearing on public 
policy issues whose importance transcends the result in the case 
before the court, or (2) the federal courts' resolution of the case 
would disrupt state efforts to establish a comprehensive policy 
regarding an issue of significant public concern.86 But, as was 
established by the S upreme Court in Quackenbush, a federal court 
has no authority to abstain pursuant to Burford if the court is not 
sitting in equity or considering an action in which the grant of 
relief is discretionary. 87 
In support of the remand, the receiver argued that Quacken­
bush's limit on the authority to exercise abstention is not iron­
clad.88 The court rejected that argument, concluding that Quack­
enbush permitted no exceptions to its rule.89 The court also 
dismissed the receiver's citation of a post-Quackenbush Fifth 
C ircuit case that affi rmed an abstention-based remand in an 
82. The dismissal was a final order so that jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1 29 1 ,  
unless it was otherwise proh ibited. See Webb, 1 74 F.3d at 699. Although 28 U.S.C. § 
1447(d) prohibits appellate review of remand orders based on defective removal procedure or 
the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the statute does not bar appellate review of remands 
based on other grounds, such as abstention. See id. at 700. 
83. See Webb, 1 74 F.3d at 70 1 .  
84. See generally Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 1 7  U.S. 706, 7 1 6-23 ( 1996). 
85. See Webb, 174 F.3d at 700. Other absention doctrines include Colorado River, 
Younger, Thibodaux, and Pullman. See generally Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. 
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 8 13-17  ( 1 976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 
(1971); Louisi ana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 25-3 1 ( 1959); 
Railro ad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 3 12  U.S. 496, 500-01 ( 1941). 
86. See Webb, 1 74 F.3d at 702 (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New 
Orleans, 49 1 U.S. 350, 36 1 (1 989)). 
87. See Webb, 1 74 F.3d at 701 (citing Quackenbush, 5 17 U.S. 730-31 ). 
88. See id. 
89. See id. at 702. 
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insurance case in which no equitab le relief was sought,90 notin g 
that the cited case did not confr ont the issue of whether the 
nature of the relief sought precluded ab stention. 91 
The receiver's final argument in favor of ab stention was that 
quantum meruit is an equitab le form of relief and that a court 
may ab stain and remand a case that includes actions at law i f  at 
least one cause of action is b ased in equity. 92 The court rejected 
the receiver's final argument b ecause the court concluded that 
actions for relief in quantum meruit are legal, not equi table 
causes of action. 93 
Thus, although the Fifth Circuit entertained the proposi tion 
that a state's plan to deal with insolvent insurers often will justify 
Burford ab stention, 94 the court reversed the remand order on 
grounds that a court errs if it ab stains in a case involvi ng n o  
claims for equitab le or discretionary reli ef. 95 
The court expressly stated that, b ecause it determined that 
quantum meruit is a legal action, it did n ot reach the i ssue of 
whether the existence of one equitab le claim would permit a court 
to ab stain and remand an entire case if the case also included 
legal claims. 96 But a dissenting opinion implicitly reached that 
issue. 97 The dissenting opinion concluded that quantum meruit 
sounds in equity b ut failed to expressly address whether an enti re 
case may b e  remanded b ased on ab stention if some, b ut not all, 
claims sound in equity. 98 Because the dissent concluded that the 
district court's order remanding the enti re case should b e  af­
firmed, the dissenting opinion implicitly answered that a sin gle 
90. See Clark v. Fitzgibbons, 1 05 F.3d 1 049, 1 052 (5th Cir. 1 997). 
91. See Webb, 174 F.3d at 702 & n.9. 
92. See id. at 701 & n.6. 
93. See id. at 704--05. 
94. See id. at 701-02. 
95. See id. at 699, 702, 704-05. 
96. See Webb, 174 F.3d at 701 & n.6. 
97. See generally id. at 705- 1 0  (Politz, J., dissenting). 
98. See id. at 707 (Politz, J., dissenting). 
2000] Federal Procedure 111 
equitable claim may justify remanding an entire case based on 
abstention. 99 
III. APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
A. Simultaneous Remand to State Court and Finding 
of No Personal Jurisdiction 
The issue before the Fifth Circuit in Falcon v. Transportes 
Aeros de Coahuila, S.A. 100 was a novel question of appellate 
jurisdiction101-whether a defendant may appeal a lower court's 
order by finding that personal jurisdiction exists, if the order is 
issued simultaneously with an order remanding the case to state 
court.102 
In Falcon, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action after a 
plane crash in Mexico. 103 The defendants removed 104 the case to 
federal court, asserting the existence of federal question jurisdic­
tion105 under the federal common law of international relations 
and treatyinterpretation.106 The plaintiff then moved to remand107 
to state court, and the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.108 
The court initially dismissed the case as to one of the defen­
dants, the air carrier, for lack of personal jurisdiction. 109 But the 
court reversed itself after finding that new evidence established 
the existence of personal jurisdiction as to the air carrier.110 The 
court issued a new order that vacated the earlier dismissal and 
held that personal jurisdiction existed. 111 On the same day that 
99. See Webb, 174 F.3d at 710 (Politz, J. , dissenting). 
100. 169 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 1999). 
101. See Falcon, l 69 F.3d at 310 ("This appeal presents us with a novel question .. . .  "). 
102. See id. 
103. See id. at 310. 
104. See id. at 311; see also 28 U.S. C. § 1441 (1994). 
105. See Falcon, l 69 F.3d at 311; see also 28 U.S. C. § 1331 (1994). 
106. See Falcon, l 69 F.3d at 311. 
107. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ( l  994). 
108. See Falcon, 169 F.3d at 311. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
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the court issued the order holding that personal jurisdiction 
existed, it also issued an order remanding the case to state court 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 112 The remand was not a 
reV iewable order. 113 The initially -dismissed defendant appealed, 
however, the order which held that personal jurisdiction exi sted. 114 
The air carrier argued that appellate jurisdiction exi sted un­
der 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral order doctrine. 115 Although 
interfo cutory decisions generally may not be appealed, the collat­
eral order doctrine provides that an interlocutory decision may be 
appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 if the decision "fi nally deter­
mine[s] claims of right separable fr om, and collateral to, rights 
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too 
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consider­
ation be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."116 
Further, even after a case has been remanded to state court, 
the doctrine permits federal appellate review of district court 
orders that preceded the remand order both " in logic and in fa ct" 
and that also are " conclusive," meaning " functionally unreview­
able in the state court."117 In Falcon, the appellate court fo cused 
whether the jurisdiction order was conclusive, an issue that the 
court note d was one of fi rst impression. 118 
The court reasoned that if the state court could reexamine the 
personal jurisdiction issue, the order was not conclusive and not 
112. See Falcon, 1 69 F.3d at 3 1 1 . 
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 447(d) ( 1 994); see also Falcon, 1 69 F.3d at 3 1  I n. l (citing 
Angelides v. Baylor College of Med., 117 F.3d 833, 835-36 (5th Cir. 1 997) (holding that a 
remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not appealable)). 
114. See Falcon, 1 69 F.3d at 3 1 1 .  
115. See Falcon, 1 69 F.3d at 3 1 1 .  
116. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 54 1 ,  546 ( 1 949)). 
117. Id. at 311 (quoting Ange/ides, 1 17 F.3d at 837 (citing City of Waco v. United States 
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 1 40, 1 43 ( l  934); Linton v. Airbus lndustrie, 30  F.3d 592, 597 
(5th Cir. 1 994))). 
118. See Fa/con, 169 F .3d at 3 1 1-12. The court cast the question of whether an order is 
"conclusive" as turning on whether the order is a ''.jurisdictional" issue that could be reviewed 
in a state court or a "substantive" issue that could not be reviewed in state court. See id. The 
court's analysis, however (as well as the analysis in the case on which the Falcon court 
relied), focused on whether the order would have preclusive effect in state court, rather than 
whether the order should be labeled "substantive" or "jurisdictional." See id.; see also 
Ange/ides, 1 1 7  F.3d at 837. 
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subject to federal appellate review.119 In turn, whether the state 
court could reexamine the personal jurisdiction issue or whether 
the district court's order had preclusive effect that would bar such 
reexamination would turn on the federal law of collateral estop­
pel. 120 The Fifth Circuit found that the order did not have preclu­
sive effect because none of the requirements for the federal 
doctrine of collateral estoppel were satisfied.121 Accordingly, the 
personal jurisdiction order was subject to reexamination in state 
court, was therefore not "conclusive," and was not subject to 
federal appellate review.122 The appeal was dismissed. 123 
B. Rule 54(b) Certification 
In Briargrove Shopping Center Joint Venture v. Pilgrim 
Enterprises, Inc., 124 the Fifth Circuit examined what 
circumstances permit appeal of a partial judgment, pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), if the district court has not 
expressly stated that it finds "no just reason for delay'' of an 
appeal. 12s 
In Briargrove, a shopping center owner found on its property, 
contaminants of a type sometimes used in dry cleaning opera­
tions. 126 The owner sued its former tenant, a former dry cleaner 
operator, asserting common law claims and a claim under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.121 The district 
court entered a declaratory judgment addressing only the CER­
CLA claim and finding the defendant liable on that claim.128 The 
same day, the court entered a judgment that it captioned "Final 
Judgment."129 This second judgment held the defendant liable for 
119. See Falcon, 169 F.3d at 312-13. 
120. See id. at 312. 
121. See id. at 312-13. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. at 313. 
124. 170 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 1999). 
125. See id. at 539. 
126. See id. at 538. 
127. See id. 
128. See id. at 538. 
129. See Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 538. 
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cleanup costs, pursuant to the fi ndings in the declaratory judg­
ment and closed with the sentence: " This is a Final J udgment."130 
The defendant ap pealed. 131 
The Fifth Circuit examined whether it had jurisdiction, noting 
that it has jurisdiction only fr om (1) fi nal decisions under 28 
U .S .C. § 1291, (2) interlocutory orders under § 1292, (3) judgments 
certified as fi nal under Federal R ule of Civil Procedure 54( b), and 
(4 ) some other non- final order or judgment to which an exception 
applies.132 The district court's " Final J udgment" was not a final 
decision under § 1291 because it did not "end[] the litigation on 
the merits."133 The common law claims and cross-claims r e­
mained. 134 Neither did the judgment satisfy the requirements of§ 
1292.135 Thus, the Fift h Circuit had appellate jurisdiction only if 
the district court's judgment was appealable under R ule 54( b). 136 
U nd er R ule 54( b), a " court may direct the entry of a final 
judgment as to . . .  fewer than all of the claims . . .  only upon an 
express determination that there is no just reason fo r delay and 
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."137 In the 
absence of these requirements, an order that adjudicates fewer 
than all the claims does not terminate the action, no matter how 
the order is designated. 138 In order to satisfy the requirements of 
R ule 54( b), a district court must determfo e that it is rendering a 
final judg ment and must determine that there exists no just 
reason for delay. 139 The Fifth Circuit has held that the district 
court need not use the words " no just reason for delay" in order to 
make a R ule 54( b) certification.140 However, the order fr om which 
an appeal is taken, together with any portions of the record to 
130. Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 538. 
131. See id. at 537. 
132. See Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 538. 
133. Id. at 538-39. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. at 538-39. 
136. See id. at 539. 
137. FED. R. C1v. P. 54(b), quoted in Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 539. 
138. See Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 539. 
139. See id. 
140. Id. 
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which the order refers, must show the district court's "unmistak­
able intent to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b)."141 
Here, the order did not show such an unmistakable intent. 
The district court did not refer to Rule 54, and neither party had 
filed a motion mentioning the rule.142 Further, before making a 
Rule 54(b) justification, a court must make at least some findings 
concerning the substantive issues relating to Rule 54(b) certifica­
tion.143 The district court, however, did not issue any orders or 
memoranda that discussed those issues.144 That the district court 
styled its order "Final Judgment" does not satisfy Rule 54(b).145 
Indeed, Rule 54(b) makes clear that "however designated," an 
order is appealable as a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) 
only if the Rule's substantive requirements are met. 146 
Finally, the defendant argued that the district court's approval 
of a supersedeas bond indicated that the court intended a Rule 
54(b) certification.147 But in determining whether a court intended 
a Rule 54(b) certification, only the order from which appeal is 
taken, and any part of the record to which the order refers, may 
be consulted. 148 The appealed order did not refer to the su­
persedeas bond, so it could not be considered.149 Further, the Fifth 
Circuit noted that even if it could consider the order approving a 
supersedeas bond, that order would not show an unmistakable 
intent that the order appealed from be certified under Rule 
54(b).150 Thus, the order was not appealable under Rule 54, and 
the appeal was dismissed. 151 
141. Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 539 (quoting Kelly v. Lee's Old Fash ioned Hamburgers , Inc. , 
908 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane)). 
142. See id. at 539-40. 
143. See Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 539-40. 
144. See id. at 540. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. 
147. See id. 
148. See Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 540. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. 
151. See id. at 54 l .  
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IV. DEFAULT JUDGMENT PROCEDURE 
The issue before the Fifth C ircuit in Rogers v. Hartford Life 
and Accident Insurance Co.152 was whether waiver of service153 
constitutes an appearance for purposes of Federal Rule of C ivil 
Procedure 5 5 (b)(2), so as to trigger the rule's requirement that 
written notice be given at least three days prior to a hearing on 2n 
application for judgment by default. 154 
In Rogers, the plaintiff brought an E RIS A claim again st his 
former employer and the insurer that provided benefits under the 
employer's long-term disability plan. 155 The former employer was 
served with process, and the insurer waived service of process. 156 
Aft er the defendants failed to answer timely, the clerk of court 
fi led an entry of default at the plaintiffs request. 157 L ater, after a 
hearing, the district court entered a default judgment against 
both defendants.158 The defendants learned of the default judge­
ment over a month later and moved to have the judgment set 
aside. 159 The court denied the motions, and the defendants ap­
pealed. 160 
On appeal, the insurer pointed out that Rule 5 5 (b)(2) requires 
that written notice be given to any defendant who has appeared in 
an action at least three days prior to a hearing on an application 
for a default judgment, and no such notice had been given. 161 The 
insurer argued that it made an appearance by waiving fo rmal 
service of process. 162 
152. 1 67 F.3d 933 (5th Cir. I 999). 
153. See FED. R. C1v. P. 4(d). 
154. See Rogers, I 67 F.3d at 936. 
155. See Rogers, 1 67 F.3d at 935. 
156. See id. The plaintiff made service by sending a copy of the summons and complaint to 
the plan administrator in New Orleans. See id. The plaintiff also requested that the insurer's 
out of state agent execute a waiver of service. See id. 
157. See id.; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 55(a). 
158. See Rogers, 167 F.3d at 935; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 55(b)(2). The district court 
opinion is reported in Rogers v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co., 1 78 F.R.D. 933 
(S.D. Miss. 1997). 
159. See Rogers, 1 67 F.3d at 935-36. 
160. See id. at 936. 
161. See id. 
162. See id. 
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The Fifth Circuit noted that its policy favors resolving cases on 
the merits, rather than by default judgments. 163 Consistent with 
this policy, the court has taken an expansive view as to what 
constitutes an appearance under Rule 55(b)(2).164 Under the 
court's expansive view, a defendant makes an appearance by 
taking any action that is responsive to the plaintiffs formal suit 
that gives the plaintiff a clear indication that the defendant 
intends to defend the suit.165 Such action can even consist of 
informal acts that demonstrate that the defendant will contest the 
claim. 166 The insurer argued that these requirements were met by 
its waiver of service and by plaintiffs knowledge that the insurer 
had denied plaintiffs claim for benefits. 167 
The court analyzed the interrelations of Rules 4, 12, and 55.168 
The court noted that a plaintiff may not obtain an entry of default 
or a default judgment unless a defendant has failed to answer as 
required by the Federal Rules. 169 In addition, a defendant is not 
required to answer until after service is made or waived. 170 Hence, 
a plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment only if the defendant 
fails to answer timely once the plaintiff has either served the 
defendant or secured a waiver of service. 
The court next considered whether acceptance of formal ser­
vice can constitute an appearance that triggers the notice re­
quirement of Rule 55(b)(2).171 The court observed that the rule's 
language shows that its notice requirement is intended to apply 
only in some circumstances in which a plaintiff is entitled to seek 
a default. 172 But, discounting waivers of service, the rule's three 
day notice would always apply if acceptance of service was an 
"appearance," because a plaintiff cannot be entitled to a default 
163. See Rogers, 167 F.3d at 936. 
164. See id. 
165. See id. at 937. 
166. See Rogers, 167 F.3d at 937. 
167. See id. 
168. See id. 
169. See id. at 937; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 55. 
170. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a); FED. R. C1v. P. 4(d)(3). 
171. See Rogers, 167 F.3d at937. 
172. See id. at 937. 
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unless s ervice has been made. 173 The court conceded that a waiv­
ing s ervice is diff erent fr om accepting s ervice, but als o noted that 
a defe ndant's waiver of s er vice s ubs titutes for the plaintiff maki ng 
s ervice, and that a waiver of s ervice, like the making of servi ce, 
trigg ers a de fendant' s oblig ation to answer. 174 Thus , concluded the 
court, neither accepting nor waiving service constitutes an ap­
pearance for purposes of Rule 55( b)( 2), s o  as to require a wri tten 
notice pr ior to a default judg ment. 175 
Finally ,  the Fifth C ircuit rejected the defe ndants '  arg ument 
that their failure to ans wer was excus able neg lect and held that 
under the facts of Rogers, the district court did not abuse i ts 
dis cretion in refus ing to s et as ide the default judgment under 
Rule 60( b)(l ) . 176 According ly , the district court's judg ment was 
affi rmed. 177 
V. STANDING 
A. Congressional Modification of Prudential Standing 
Rules Via NVRA 
In Association of Community Organizations For Reform Now v. 
Fowler, 178 the Fifth C ircuit address ed iss ues concerning both the 
cons tit utional and prudential limitations on..s tanding . 179 
In Fowler, the As sociation of C ommunity Org anizati on for Re­
form Now ( " AC ORN") broug ht s uit ag ainst L ouis iana of fici als, 
alleg ing that L ouis iana's voter reg is tration procedures vi olate 
s everal provis ions of the National Voter Regis tration Act 
("NVRA"), 4 2  U .S. C .  § 1973 gg .180 In particular, AC ORN alleg ed 
173. See Rogers, 1 67 F.3d at 937. 
174. See id. at 937-38. 
175. See id. at 938. The appellate court also held that the plaintiffs service on the former 
employer was a proper method of service under the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and 
therefore proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e). See Rogers 167  F.3d at 940. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusfng to set aside the default judgments 
under Rule 60(b)(l). See id. at 940--943. 
176. See id. at 938. 
177. See id. at 944. 
178. 1 78 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1 999). 
179. See id. at 356-65. 
180. See id. at 353.  
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that L ouisiana violated the NVRA by failing to make voter 
r egistr ation mater ials available at public aid offices, by failing to 
include voter r egistr ation car ds in packets that per mitted dr iver 's 
license r enewals by mail, and by impr oper ly pur ging names fr om 
voter r olls. 181 The defendants moved for summar y  judgment on 
the gr ound that AC ORN lacked standing.182 The distr ict cour t 
gr anted the motion, concluding that AC ORN lacked standing to 
sue on its own behalf or as a r epr esentative of its member s. 183 
Reviewing the distr ict cour t' s gr ant of summar y  judgment de 
novo, 184 the Fifth C ir cuit began by examining whether AC ORN 
had standing to sue on its own behalf. 185 The cour t noted that 
standing is gover ned both by constitutional r equir ements and 
pr udential limitations. 186 The constitutional r equir ements for 
standing ar ise fr om Ar ticle Ill 's case or contr over sy 
r equir ement. 187 The pr udential limitations on standing ar ise fr om 
jur ispr udence only and can be modifi ed or abr ogated by 
C ongr ess. 188 
To br ing a claim, a plaintiff must have Ar ticle III standing, 
and he must satisfy the r equir ements of pr udential standing 
unless the r equir ements of pr udential standing have been 
waived. 189 Addr essing Ar ticle III standing fir st, the cour t noted 
that an or ganization' s standing to sue on its own behalf is 
m easur ed by the same standar d as applies to individuals. 190 That 
standar d r equir es that the plaintiff demonstr ate " injur y in fact" 
that is "fair ly tr aceable" to the defendant's actions, " and that the 
i njury will likely be r edr essed by a favor able decision. "191 An 
181. See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 355. 
182. See id. 
183. See id. at 355-56. 
184. See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 356. 
185. See id. 
186. See id. 
187. See id. 
188. See id. 
189. See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 356. 
190. See id. (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79 ( 1982)). 
191. Id. 
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org ani zati on can demonstrate i njury i n  fact by showi ng " concrete 
and d emonstrable i njury to the org ani zati on's acti v i tes ."192 
The court rejected ACOR N's asserti on that i ts costs of 
li tig ati on ag ai nst the defendants quali fied as an i njury i n  fact. 193 
If costs of li tig ati ng the very case i n  whi ch standi ng i s  challeng ed 
quali fied as an i njury i n  fact, the requi rement of i njury always 
would be sati fied . 194 The court also rejected ACOR N's asserti on 
tli at i ts costs of moni tori ng whether L oui si ana com pli ed wi th the 
NVRA quali fied as an i njury i n  fact. 195 The problem wi th 
ACORN 's alleg ati on reg ardi ng i ts moni tori ng costs was that 
ACOR N had sugg ested that i ts moni tori ng acti vi ty was part of i ts 
normal operati ons, not somethi ng done as a result of L oui si ana' s  
aU eg ed NVRA vi olati ons.196 
Fi nally, ACOR N poi nted to costs that i t  i ncurred i n  conducti ng 
voter reg istrati on dri ves. 197 The court concluded that most of 
ACOR N's voter reg i strati on acti vi tes were not shown to be the 
result of alleg ed NVRA vi olati ons by L oui si ana. 198 But, ACORN's 
summary judg ment evi dence showi ng that i t  conducted 
reg i strati on dri ves focused on people i n  " welfare wai ti ng rooms, 
unem ploym ent offices, and on Food S tamp li nes" was suffici ent to 
rai se a g enui ne i ssue reg ardi ng whether ACOR N would have 
i ncurred the expenses of those reg i strati on dri ves i f  L oui si ana had 
compli ed wi th NVRA 's requi rement that voter reg i strati on 
materials be avai lable at publi c aid offices. 199 T hus, ACOR N 
establi shed Arti cle III stand i ng as to i ts clai m reg ard i ng lack of 
voter materi als at publi c ai d offi ces.200 ACORN, however, fai led to 
show Arti cle III standi ng reg ardi ng i ts other clai ms because i t  
fai led to show i njury ari si ng fr om the other alleg ed NVRA 
192. Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 357 (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 
(1 982)). 
193. See id. at 358. 
194. See id. at 358-59. 
195. See id. at 359. 
196. See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 359. 
197. See id. 
198. See id. at 360. 
199. See id. at 361 . 
200. See id. at 362. 
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violations.201 Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary 
judgment was reversed as to the claim regarding lack of voter 
materials at public aid offices, but was affirmed regarding 
ACORN's other claims brought on its own behalf. 202 
Because ACORN demonstrated Article III standing as to one 
of its claims, the court next addressed whether ACORN satisfied 
the requirements of prudential standing as to that claim.203 The 
prudential limitations on standing generally require that a 
plaintiffs grievance arguably falls within a zone of interest 
protected by the statute at issue, that a claim not raise purely 
abstract questions or generalized grievances best addressed by the 
legislative branch, and that the plaintiff be asserting its own 
rights, rather than those of others. 204 The court's analysis, 
however, focused not on whether these requirements were met, 
but whether the requirements were waived by the NVRA.205 
After acknowledging again that Congress may alter or 
abrogate the requirements of prudential standing, the court noted 
that the NVRA provides that after a "person who is aggrieved by a 
violation of NVRA"206 satisfies certain notice requirements, the 
"aggrieved person may bring a civil action in an appropriate 
district court."207 Although the NVRA does not define "aggrieved 
person," the court relied on jurisprudence interpreting similar 
language in other federal statutes and concluded that Congress 
had intended to abrogate the requirements of prudential standing 
in order "to extend standing under the [NVRA] to the maximum 
allowable under the Constitution."208 Further, based on the 
provision in 1 U .S .C .  § 1, in federal statutes the word "person" 
includes corporations, associations, and various other entities, 
201. See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 362. 
202. See id. at 365. 
203. See id. at 362-63. 
204. See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 363. 
205. See id. at 363-64. 
206. Id. at 363 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1 973gg-9(b)( I )  ( 1 994)). 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
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except if provided otherwise, and because NVRA does not provide 
otherwise, ACORN qualifed as a "person aggrieved."209 
The court then analyzed whether ACORN had 
representational standing to litigate claims of its members. 210 An 
association has representative standing if (a) its members would 
have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests that the 
association seeks to protect are germane to its purpose; and (c) 
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 
individual members to participate in the lawsuit. 211 The court 
concluded that except on the claim regarding the failure to supply 
voter registration materials at public aid offices, a claim on which 
ACORN had standing in its own right, ACORN failed to show that 
any of its members would have standing in their own right. 212 
Thus, ACORN's representational standing was restricted to the 
. same claim on which it had standing in its own right . 
. Accordingly, the lower court's grant of summary judgment was 
reversed as to the single claim, but otherwise affirmed.213 
B. Congressional Modification of Prudential Standing 
Rules Via FRCP 17 
The Fifth Circuit discussed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
17's effect on third party standing limitations in Ensley v. Cody 
Resources, Inc. 214 In Ensley, the plaintiff formed a closely-held 
corporation, through which he did work for the defendant on 
numerous transactions.215 The parties reduced their agreement to 
writing for a few early transactions, but not for later 
transactions. 216 The defendant eventually terminated its 
relationship with the plaintiff, who subsequently sued for shares 
of stock allegedly owed to him by the defendant in lieu of a 
209. See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 364-65. 
210. See id. at 365. 
211. See id. at 365 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 
343 ( 1977)). 
212. See id. at 365-67. 
213. See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 367-68. 
214. 1 7 1  F.3d 3 1 5 ,  reh 'g denied, 1 8 1  F.3d 98 (5th Cir. 1 999). 
215. Id. at 3 1 7. 
216. See id. at 3 1 7- 1 8. 
2000] Federal Procedure 123 
commission for work on a transaction where terms were not 
reduced to writing.217 At the close of the plaintiffs case-in-chief, 
the defendant moved for a judgment as a matter of law.218 The_ 
court denied the motion and later entered judgment on a 
subsequent jury verdict that found the defendant liable in 
quantum meruit, but not in contract.219 
The defendant again moved for a judgment as a matter of law, 
arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing because the claim he 
asserted belonged to his closely-held corporation, not to him. 220 
The court initially granted the renewed motion.221 But later, the 
court sua sponte reversed course, reasoning that the actual basis 
of the defendant's objection was a real-party-in-interest objection 
that was waived because it was not raised before trial.222 The 
defendant appealed the court's reentry of judgment for the 
1 . t'ff. 223 p am 1 • 
The Fifth Circuit noted that standing includes both 
constitutional limitations and prudential limitations on the claims 
that may be litigated in federal court.224 One of the prudential 
limitations is that a plaintiff generally may not bring a claim that 
is based on the rights of third parties.225 However, because the 
limitation on third party standing is not constitutional, the 
Congress may alter or abrogate the general prohibition on third 
party claims. 226 In fact, Congress has altered third party standing 
limitations by regulating the real-party-in-interest objection 
through Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 17;227 those rules 
provide that a real-party-in-interest defense must be raised in a 
responsive pleading.228 Because the defendant waited until the 
217. See Ensley, 1 7 1  F.3d at 3 1 8 . 
218. See id. ; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 50 (judgment as a matter of law). 
219. See Ensley, 1 7 1  F.3d at 3 1 8. 
220. See id. 
221. See id. 
222. See id. ; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 1 7 . 
223. See Ensley, 1 7 1  F.3d at 3 1 8- 1 9. 
224. See id. 
225. See id. 
226. See id. at 3 20 . 
. 
227. See id. ; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 1 2  (defenses must be asserted in responsive plead­
ings); FED. R. C1v. P. 1 7  (real-party-in-interest). 
228. See Ensley, 1 7 1  F.3d at 320. 
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end of plaintiffs case-in�hief to assert its objection, the defense 
was waived.229 Accordingly, the district court's judgment was 
affirmed. 230 
VI. FIRST-TO-FILE RULE 
The Fifth Circuit reviewed a district court's application of the 
first-to-file rule in Cadle Co. v. Whataburger, Inc. 231 In Whata­
burger, a company filed claims in the bankruptcy proceedings of a 
debtor in the Southern District of Texas, attempting to recover on 
a prior judgment.232 After a setback in the bankruptcy proceeding, 
the company filed a complaint in the federal district court for the 
Western District of Texas.233 The complaint named associates and 
family members of the debtor as defendants, and alleged that the 
defendants helped the debtor fraudulently transfer assets to avoid 
payment on the prior judgment.234 The defendants moved to 
dismiss the complaint on the basis of the first-to-file rule, and the 
court granted the motion. 235 
The plaintiff appealed, asserting that the district court should 
not have applied the first-to-file rule without first determining 
whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over his claim. 236 
In the alternative, the plaintiff argued that the district court 
should have transferred, rather than dismissed, the case.237 As a 
preliminary matter, the Fifth Circuit noted the standard of 
review.238 Generally, application of the first-to-file rule, a discre­
tionary doctrine, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.239 But be­
cause the plaintiff raised issues regarding the nature and scope of 
229. See Ensley, 1 7 1  F.3d at 320. 
230. See id. at 3 2 1 ,  323. 
23 1. 1 74 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 1 999). 
232. Id. at 60 1 .  
233. See id. at 602. 
234. See Cadle, 1 74 FJd at 601. 
235. See id. 
236. See id. at 600, 602-03. 
237. See id. at 600, 606. 
238. See id. at 603. 
239. See Cadle, 1 74 F.3d at 603. 
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the doctrine, rather than its application on the facts, the district 
court's ruling was reviewed de novo.240 
Next, the appellate court examined the first-to-file rule it­
self.241 The rule has the purpose of serving judicial economy and 
comity.242 Under the rule, when related cases are pending before 
two district courts, the second court should determine whether 
there exists substantial overlap in the issues raised by the two 
cases.243 If substantial overlap exists, the second court generally 
must transfer its case to the court in which the first action was 
filed. 244 Then, the court where the first action was filed deter­
mines whether the second suit should be "dismissed, stayed or 
transferred and consolidated."245 
Addressing the plaintiffs arguments, the Fifth Circuit rejected 
the contention that a federal court should determine whether 
another court has jurisdiction before applying the first-to-file 
rule. 246 The court contrasted the first-to-file rule with collateral 
estoppel, which applies only if the court making a prior ruling had 
jurisdiction. 247 Both the first-to-file rule and collateral estoppel 
promote judicial economy, but they do so in different ways.248 
Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues on which a court 
already has ruled. 249 But a ruling is void if rendered by a court 
that lacks jurisdiction.250 Thus, because collateral estoppel binds 
litigants to a prior ruling, it makes sense to require that a court 
apply collateral estoppel only after finding that the prior court 
had jurisdiction.251 
240. See Cadle, 1 74 F.3d at 603. 
241. See id. at 603-06. 
242. See id. at 603. 
243. See id. at 605. 
244. See id. at 605-606. 
245. Cadle, 1 74 F.3d at 606. 
246. See id. at 603. 
247. See id. at 603-04. 
248. See id. at 603. 
249. See id. 
250. See Cadle, 1 74 F.3d at 603-04. 
251. See id. 
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In contrast to collateral estoppel, the first-to-file rule does not 
bind litigants to a prior ruling. 252 Instead, the rule promotes judi­
cial economy by avoiding wasteful parallel litigation when there 
exists a pending case that raises substantially the same issues.253 
Requiring the second court to examine whether the first court had 
jurisdiction might undermine judicial economy and result in both 
courts examining the same issue. 254 While the jurisdiction of the 
first court might sometimes be worthy of consideration in deciding 
whether to follow the first-to-file rule, the first court itself is the 
court to consider that issue-after the second case is transferred 
to it.255 Thus, the district court in Cadle, as the "second" court, did 
not err by limiting its inquiry to whether a substantial overlap of 
issues existed. 256 The district court erred by dismissing, how­
ever. 257 The district court should have transferred and let the first 
court decide what to do with the transferred case.258 The Fifth 
Circuit vacated and remanded, with instructions to transfer the 
case to the first court. 259 
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